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Abstract 
This article comprises a comparative exploration of the conception of 
temporality by Iannis Xenakis and Brian Ferneyhough, as well as a study of 
their compositional responses to this conceptualization. Xenakis remarked that 
music exists primarily “outside of time,” whereas Ferneyhough reflects on the 
“tactility of time.” These ideas are developed here within a phenomenological 
framework, with particular reference to concepts by Jean-Luc Nancy, mainly 
those of sense and resonance. When cross-examined, Xenakis’s and 
Ferneyhough’s approaches, although quite different, are shown to resonate with 
each other, as both developed compositional methods based on sieves: the 
former for the production of sonorities and the latter as a means to formal 
articulation. 
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We have to consciously destroy these liminal structures of time, space, 
logic… 
—Iannis Xenakis 
 
To notate the work is at one and the same time to listen to its echo. 
—Brian Ferneyhough 
 
1. Introduction 
The figures of Iannis Xenakis and Brian Ferneyhough occupy distinct positions in the 
history post-WWII composition. Their oeuvre has preoccupied performers and 
musicologists in quite different ways. However, whereas the former would not hesitate 
for a moment to programme works by the two composers in the same concert, 
musicological work has insisted in keeping them apart. This is justifiable considering 
their different historical milieux. The two composers are almost one generation apart 
and Ferneyhough has referred to Xenakis only in passing1 (when he differentiated his 
approach from that of the younger generation, who have studied Xenakis’s work more 
closely; see Ferneyhough 1995: 425). Further, their compositional engagement exhibits 
sharp differences: whereas the name of Xenakis implies a “scientificist” approach, 
Ferneyhough is associated with “complexity.” However, although their differences are 
significant, such comments seem to only scratch the surface as they point to one-
dimensional labels of no consensual acceptance (certainly not by the composers 
themselves). 
 This article aims at unfolding a comparative study of intellectual and musical 
divergencies and convergences between the two, as they can be seen in their conception 
of musical temporality and in their respective compositional methods. After I briefly 
introduce their differences in compositional practice, I examine their conceptualization 
of temporality and then, back to their compositional attitude, I analyse their particular 
responses to issues raised by their critical thinking of musical time. The latter are 
located in the treatment of musical entities, formal articulation and practices of notation. 
My philosophical examination relies on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy with particular 
reference to his notions of sense (sens) and resonance. The former is taken in its two 
meanings of the bodily sense of sensibility (sensation) and that of intelligibility 
                                                
1 One exception is his collaborative article on Xenakis’s ST/10-1 080262 (Keller and Ferneyhough 2004). 
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(understanding). Resonance, by analogy, is related here to a certain sonorous materiality 
and to musical representation through notation. The former pertains mostly to Xenakis’s 
practice and the latter to that of Ferneyhough. 
 Xenakis’s and Ferneyhough’s practices are indeed distinctly different: the former 
favoured a statistical approach to handling the global and local properties of sound 
masses, whereas the latter’s compositional strategies frequently employ linearly-
conceived multiple layers of musical activity. Interestingly (or even strangely) when it 
comes to their conception of musical time, it is Xenakis who thinks linearly whereas 
Ferneyhough allows for a greater degree of complexity in temporal interpretation. I will 
show that ultimately, when cross-examined against Nancy’s categories, both composers 
have touched upon different aspects of the same problematics of temporal experience in 
music. That is, the point of contact of their differing practices is precisely the idea that 
meaningful musical experience is beyond temporal linearity: to the former, this 
corresponds to the outside-time category and to the latter to oblique temporal 
sensations.2 Xenakis’s compositional response re-invented the musical scale as 
multiplicities of timbre classes, which he termed sieves; Ferneyhough’s compositional 
strategies re-inscribed the function of complex notation and developed musical 
processes that correspond to what I call formal sieves of competing and interfering 
concurrent processes. 
 Let us take two works from either composers’ early period. Xenakis first 
conceived of mass sonorities for Metastaseis, but the formal introduction of stochastics 
came with Pithoprakta (1955-56). The orchestra is divided to the extreme and the work 
follows what Solomos has called the “sound model” (1996: 27), progressing from noise 
to pure harmonics. Measures 52-59 comprise a well-known stochastic paradigm, a cloud 
of over one thousand glissandi allocated among the instruments according to a 
particular distribution (Gaussian). Example 1 shows the graph sketch by Xenakis and 
Example 2 the corresponding part of the score. Linearity has completely disappeared 
                                                
2 Regarding linearity for example, both Xenakis and Ferneyhough identified the discrepancy between 
process and result in serial music. The former indicated “a contradiction between the linear polyphonic 
system and the heard result which is surface, mass” (Xenakis 1994: 42). Ferneyhough held the same 
point, in particular about integral serialism (see Ferneyhough 1995: 78), although his critique was 
directed to the responses to this impasse (as he was writing this much later). In any case, both composers 
responded differently to what they identified as the same problem: Xenakis by rejecting linearity and 
introducing the category of mass sonorities and Ferneyhough by developing complex multi-linear 
processes. 
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and forward motion is achieved almost exclusively by manipulating the sound mass and 
its evolution in time (by changing its direction, average density, instrumentation, timbre, 
intensity, etc.). Ferneyhough’s Epicycle was composed in 1968 for string ensemble or 
“twenty solo strings” based on a “soloistic voice-leading” (Ferneyhough 1995: 89). In 
this case, individuation of the ensemble has not lead to mass sonorities; to the contrary, 
as it can be seen in Example 3, the individual instrumental line is meant to engage each 
performer in a polyphonic, mimetic, or homophonic whole. These compositional 
attitudes have been maintained by both composers throughout their oeuvre; however, 
they have changed in form, as new considerations arose. One overall guiding theme, 
common to both, is none other than the role of temporality in music perception and 
composition. 
 
 
Example 1. Xenakis, Pithoprakta, manuscript graph of mm. 52-59. Source: Xenakis Archives. Reproduced by 
permission. 
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                            Example 2. Xenakis, Pithoprakta, mm. 52-57. © Copyright 1967 by Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishers Ltd. Reproduced by permission of Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers 
Ltd. 
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Example 3. Ferneyhough, Epicycle, p. 13. © Copyright 1968 by Hinrichsen 
Edition Ltd. Reproduced by kind permission of Peters Edition Limited, London. 
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2. Temporality 
The discussion of time in music inevitably defines one’s approach to ontological issues, 
such as the status of the musical work and its perception—issues that pertain to the 
construction and treatment of sonic objects as well as overall formal articulation.3 The 
matter is not simply the treatment of metric and rhythmic structures, but an approach to 
temporality, as that which enables and structures the experience of music. This involves 
a phenomenological discussion on the perception of time and space through the senses 
or the mind; as well as on the experience of subjectivity, presence, or materiality. Such 
themes, to the extent they relate to the thinking of Xenakis and Ferneyhough, permeate 
the discussion unfolded in the remaining of this article. 
 Both Xenakis and Ferneyhough have published extensively on their philosophy 
and practice. Their explicit preoccupation with temporality can be seen in a few texts of 
the 1980s, where they introduced their themes and references, as well as examples of 
compositional techniques and specific works. These texts, such as Xenakis’s 
“Concerning, Time, Space and Music”4 and Ferneyhough’s “The Tactility of Time,” 
discuss the temporal in terms that are akin to a phenomenological reading. Thus, I 
propose a provisional, introductory reading according to concepts by Edmund Husserl 
and Martin Heidegger for Xenakis and Ferneyhough respectively; but ultimately, both 
composers’ ideas are shown to resonate with distinct categories of Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
philosophy, as his thinking relies on the phenomenological tradition of the above-
mentioned thinkers. 
 Over the decades, as I have already indicated (Exarchos 2015), Xenakis’s account 
of temporality took two forms: earlier, in a compositional/analytical account he 
discussed the matter in relation to structures like sets, scales, and sequences; later, in a 
more philosophical account, he discussed this in terms of perception, exploring the 
importance of mnemonic traces during listening. As I will show, Xenakis suggested that 
our perception is constantly shifting—in a sort of quantum leap—between the temporal 
and the non-temporal aspect of music. Ferneyhough’s account of temporality uses terms 
such as “tactility” in order to denote a “concrete,” “physical” sense of time. He 
conceives of temporality in relation to a non-linear sensation of time: a linearly-
                                                
3 However, a problematics of musical ontology cannot be exhausted here. 
4 Henceforth “Concerning Time.” 
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conceived temporal flow—although an immediate given—is not what structures 
musical experience. Further, he made explicit that such considerations are directly 
related to music’s ontological status (with reference to Derrida) and that this status 
essentially depends on a special kind of motion. Echoing Xenakis, Ferneyhough 
suggests that the listening subject at moments “stands apart” and consciousness is 
engaged in an act of scanning and measuring outside of the immediate time-flow. 
 
2.1 Xenakis 
Xenakis denied the importance given by most composers to the temporal aspect of 
music. He explicitly privileged that which is ontologically independent of time, that 
which “remains of music once time has been removed” (1976: 211). His practice was 
largely intended to provide alternatives to articulating the non-temporal; as such, his 
theory of sieves (see Xenakis 1992: 268-276) was meant to provide tools for the 
construction of outside-time structures. 
 Interested in the mensurability of time, Xenakis considered time as a linear 
structure that can be “expressed with real numbers, and shown as points on a straight 
line” (Varga 1996: 82-83).5 In several writings, Xenakis demonstrated his theory of 
temporality as a schema of two categories: outside-time and inside-time, while 
occasionally he would include a third, the temporal category. Any structure that does 
not require concepts of causality (e.g. “before” or “after”) in order to be described is 
outside of time; whereas, if causal terms are necessary, the structure is inside time.6 
Therefore, a scale is outside of time but a melody based on that scale is inside time.7 
Rhythmic and durational structures (or the overall temporal structure of the work), is 
where outside-time structures are mapped onto, in order to produce the work inside 
time. This third term, the temporal appears only idiosyncratically in Xenakis’s writings; 
as I have shown (Exarchos 2008: chapter 1), his schema eventually collapses into two 
categories, if anything, because the middle term can be viewed by both angles: as a 
                                                
5 This linear conception of time does not imply, of course, that Xenakis’s music does not include non-
linear forms. 
6 Although succession and causality might not always be identical, Xenakis links the two in his discussion 
of chains of events and their reconstruction in memory (1992: 263), which I will examine later. 
7 A mathematical equivalent would be the distinction between set (outside of time) and sequence (inside 
time): the set's elements are arranged according to their intrinsic properties (e.g. smaller to larger), 
whereas the sequence requires a certain ordering (including any repetitions). 
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rhythmic sequence (whose elements follow the logic of causality), it is inside time; as a 
mensurable structure it is outside of time. Xenakis’s compositional response came with 
the theory of sieves. This is a method for the production of scales (either as pitch scales 
or as rhythmic sequences), based on residue classes and set-theoretical operations on 
these classes, aiming at deeper levels of symmetry via a number-theoretic approach. 
What is important for my point here, is that Xenakis privileged the construction and use 
of scales over recourse to melodic shapes. Considering that his abstract image of time as 
points on a straight line is also the abstract schema of a sieve, he was able to maintain 
that rhythmic/durational structures too have an outside-time aspect. Already from the 
1960s, Xenakis went as far as to claim that, although there is such a thing as “rhythm in 
its pure form,” all music has an outside-time nature (1994: 68). 
 During the 1980s he was increasingly concerned with temporality and the 
perception of time in listening. His main thesis that music takes place mainly outside of 
time remained, but he was now preoccupied with how this is possible.8 In “Concerning 
Time”9 Xenakis demonstrates his approach around three key terms: separability, 
contiguity, and anteriority. The first two are prerequisites for the third and as such, I 
suggest, they are more important. It is necessary that events are separable in order to be 
perceivable; that is, events need to be experienced as discreet, so that we can compare 
them and perceive the temporal relations between them. This separability is in turn co-
dependant with contiguity, the state of direct contact; this is an invocation of 
materialism (see Xenakis 1992: 203), as direct contact of separate entities implies a 
fundamental materiality. Finally, anteriority stands for succession, causality, that which 
exists inside time. 
 Concerning the first term, Xenakis uses the metaphor of the trace in relation to 
temporality: “Thanks to separability, [perceived] events can be assimilated to landmark 
points in the flux of time, points which are instantaneously hauled up outside of time 
because of their trace in our memory” (1992: 264).10 As I suggested earlier, this is an 
                                                
8 For Xenakis the inside-time category refers to the instantaneous, that which “does not exist” (Xenakis 
1969: 51). In this sense, his philosophy of music was in search of an ontology rather than a dialectics. 
9 The history of this article can be traced back to 1981, while it received its final form in Xenakis 1992 
(see Solomos 2001: 237). 
10 The function of tracing relates directly to that of writing and Xenakis has occasionally referred to time 
as a blank blackboard into which structures are inscribed (see Xenakis 1992: 173 and Varga 1996: 84). 
For a critical exploration of the deconstructive function of writing in Xenakis’s dichotomy see Exarchos 
2008: chapter 2. 
Peer-Reviewed Paper                                JMM: The Journal of Music and Meaning, vol. 13, 2014/2015  
69 
 
instance of how music in general—including rhythm—is placed outside of time. 
Although Xenakis has not referenced Edmund Husserl except once in a footnote (1992: 
377 n. 1), we can find a Husserlian element in this approach to time-consciousness. 
Xenakis’s account is phenomenological to the extent that it is concerned with what 
presents itself to consciousness. Importantly, in phenomenology the viable question 
does not relate directly to the ontological status of things independent from experience, 
but to the way reality discloses itself to, or constitutes itself in conscious experience. 
According to Husserl, the experience of spatiality cannot be separated from a certain 
temporality. He maintained that both past and future elements are incorporated in the 
constitution of momentary sensation, in a movement of retention and protention 
(anticipation). Husserl’s favoured example for this was the “tonal process” of the 
melody. He considered the melody as a unitary temporal object that “is past only after 
the final tone is gone” (1991: 40). However, like Xenakis, he insisted on the 
discreteness of individual tones—the tone given now, the tones elapsed, and the ones 
anticipated. In Husserl’s words, “at any given time only one punctual phase is present as 
now, while the others are attached as a retentional tail” (1991: 41). Experiential unity as 
such is achieved via mnemonic means (retention being our short-term memory, as 
opposed to recollection). We see in this way, that Xenakis’s account echoes Husserl’s 
with regard to the basic postulate of the separability of individual events.11 
 This linking of time and space is also found in Xenakis’s own conception; in 
particular, he suggests that space is perceptible only across the infinity of “chains of 
energy transformations” (Xenakis 1992: 257). In a materialist world-view, a void in 
space-time is inconceivable by immediate consciousness. Thus, the events in such 
chains are necessarily contiguous (and separable). Given the above presuppositions, 
Xenakis suggests a thought experiment: 
 
Two chains of contiguous events without a common link can be indifferently 
synchronous or anterior in relation to each other; time is once again abolished in 
the temporal relation of each of the universes of events represented by the two 
chains (1992: 263). 
 
                                                
11I have indicated the connection between Husserl's and Xenakis's accounts of temporality in (Exarchos 
2012: 9) where I also related this to Xenakis's “interpenetration of the tenses.” 
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Therefore, separation and direct contact of events are the essential conditions for the 
temporal experience; for perceiving, that is, events in temporal succession (Xenakis’s 
anteriority). So, when Xenakis talked of the “removal of time” he must have meant the 
removal of one or more of these three aspects. The removal of separability would 
abolish time due to absolute smoothness; that of contiguity would render time 
inconceivable; and the removal of anteriority would entail a universe of absolute 
simultaneity (see Xenakis 1992: 262-263). 
 We see therefore how Xenakis defines time as causality or succession; in other 
words, one-dimensional, linear. However, this is precisely why Xenakis insisted so 
much on the outside-time category; the everyday conception of time is that of linear 
time, which music has nothing to gain from, as it operates outside of such linearity. 
Xenakis’s treatment relies on a certain spatio-temporalizing movement that structures 
temporal consciousness due to contiguity and separability, and which is not very 
different from the idea of a phenomenological primary spatiality/temporality that 
enables the experience of everyday space and time as such. 
 
2.2 Ferneyhough 
At around the same time as Xenakis, Ferneyhough presented his theorization of 
temporality in the “The Tactility of Time,” originally a talk at the Darmstadt Summer 
Course of 1988 (Ferneyhough 1995: 42-50), where he discussed the possibilities of a 
palpable sensation of time in music (cf. Ferneyhough and Boros 1994: 123). Unlike 
Xenakis, Ferneyhough presupposes a non-linear conception of time. The possibility for 
concrete temporal sensations can only arise in moments when perception is detached 
from the immediate time-flow, “standing apart” and operating on a “speculative time-
space” (Ferneyhough 1995: 43). Ferneyhough’s talk comprises a programmatic 
statement in search of an appropriate language on temporality, with regard to 
Mnemosyne (composed in 1986 for bass flute and tape, as the final part of the Carceri 
d’Invenzione cycle). The resonance with Xenakis’s account, especially the idea of 
standing-apart, is a further suggestion of such potential. In order to do so, it is necessary 
to refer to certain developments of Husserl’s ideas in the work of Martin Heidegger. 
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 Compared to Husserl, Heidegger was more interested in perception as the 
purposeful involvement in the concrete world.12 Such involvement means that being is 
being-in-the-world, a world that is always already there; thus, spatiality is an event of 
disclosure or opening to the world. According to Morin (2012: 24), the mode of 
disclosure is that of “understanding,” the decoding of a context and of available tools 
(although such understanding need not be conceptual). Spatial experience is always also 
temporal and as an opening to the concrete world the structure of temporality is 
“ecstatic” (“standing outside of”) (cf. James 2006: 84). 
 Similar to Xenakis’s placing outside of time, Ferneyhough’s “standing-apart” 
denotes the “ecstatic” structure of temporality. Whereas the former conceived it (in a 
Husserlian manner) as a process of retentions and protentions, for the latter standing-
apart takes place during our engagement with music (the “world”) which is conceived 
as a complex dynamic process involving the here-and-now of one’s own meaningful 
experience. This is clear in Ferneyhough’s essay when he invokes the schema of the 
feedback loop between bodily temporality (breathing, heartbeat, etc.) and the “metric 
lattice” that mediates musical objects. The perception of time is conditioned by this 
relationship, according to a continually moving perspective. Ontological overtones arise 
at the conclusion of his argument: the listener’s perspective changes constantly with 
respect to “the understanding of what is to count as an object at that point in the 
relationship” (Ferneyhough 1995: 44). Here, “standing apart,” “measuring,” “scanning,” 
all refer to the kind of movement of projecting forward and backward, beyond mere 
retentions and protentions, according to an “irregular segmentation of experiential 
continuity” (Ferneyhough 1995: 43), a temporal continuity of differentiated “thickness.” 
Such measuring is then constantly re-evaluated, according to the relationship between 
the two aforementioned poles (bodily condition and metric lattice), in the process of 
being constantly engaged with the music in a way that affords an experience beyond 
momentary immediacy. This is possible because our attempts of temporal interpretation 
are non-theoretical; Heidegger (1996) terms this kind of engagement circumspection. 
Opposed to theory or to leisurely looking around, circumspection refers to an attentive 
                                                
12 He criticized Husserl for the ideality with which he had invested his phenomenological account, such as 
his phenomenological reduction, which excludes knowledge, belief, or other preconceptions when 
studying the experience of the world; or, such as his transcendental ego, that functions as the ultimate 
foundation of the relation between acts of consciousness and its objects. 
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and associative interpretation of actual affordances and possibilities in one’s being-in-
the-world. Such temporal interpretation is based on an ever-changing perspective of a 
projected future. Although retentional memory is also important, Ferneyhough’s non-
linear conception of time allows him to speak of “obliqueness” in the temporal 
experience (1995: 49), in a way that defies the Husserlian schema: the experience of 
listening “circumspectfully” goes beyond the paradigm of the linear melody. 
 A few years earlier, in “Il Tempo della Figura” (1995: 33-41) Ferneyhough 
discussed the general possibilities of energy release, which he terms force, conceived 
with the aid of a basic distinction between gesture and figure.13 The former is 
comparable to the linguistic vocable, a part of rhetoric with no inherent capacity of 
expressive energy (it is only expressive of sentiment). In contrast, the term figure is 
used to indicate a certain kind of “energetic volatility” as the potential of concrete 
gestures. Ferneyhough’s exposition of such thoughts is introduced by the image 
(borrowed from a poem by John Ashbery) of a breaking wave. The figure relates to a 
wave breaking on a rock, whereby gesture expresses a shape that it gives up 
immediately: a shape that we realize only after it is gone (Ferneyhough 1995: 33). By 
avoiding proper definitions, Ferneyhough’s compositional thinking invokes the figure 
as the “aura” that is potentially found in any concrete gesture, constellation, or formal 
unit (Ferneyhough 1995: 37). What allows him to indicate the place of the figure at the 
intersection of already-defined “vocables” is precisely his insistence on the nature of 
temporality in relation to conscious perception. According to Fitch, “Figurally charged 
parameters seek to escape the gesture, and the latter to recapture them, albeit incurring 
damage in the process. The continuous journey of the figural, from synthesis, to 
independence and ‘back to’ renewed synthesis … implies a temporal progression” 
(2005: 419-20). This insistence on movement allows Ferneyhough to think of the figure 
as an essential potentiality of musical consciousness: “our ‘life-line’ to reality might 
perhaps be interpreted as a special form of motion;” this is the movement of the 
breaking wave where “the present constitutes itself only as sensed absence” (1995: 35). 
 These sentences echo Derrida’s discourse (1997) and Ferneyhough is quite 
explicit about the importance of différance in conscious experience and its temporality: 
 
                                                
13 See also Ferneyhough 1995: 21-28 & 131-38. 
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Musical consciousness is always the impingement of the past upon the array of 
possible futures to which (pace Derrida) it continually defers. The moment itself 
is defined, not by any constancy of material substratum, but by its motion; it is the 
projection of figural energies which make the pointer visible by means of which 
the motion is measured (Ferneyhough 1995: 36). 
 
This is not only anti-materialist, but also anti-foundationalist. The absence of ground 
appeals to the deconstructive claim against stable meaning: the breaking wave, one may 
say, is not receptive of damming barriers. Différance (an economic concept for 
differing/deferring) describes the kind of movement according to which “figural 
energies” afford the capacity of temporal measurement. The above quotation further 
reveals Ferneyhough’s focus on the projection of energies, that is, on the futural aspect 
of temporality. This future—always deferred—is conceived as the oblique directionality 
of time. Using Heidegger’s terminology, “being futural” refers to Being (Dasein) 
“running ahead” towards its ownmost possibility. But this future is not conceived in any 
narrow sense of an “already-there” that is in store for us; rather, this futuralness is Βeing 
itself: 
 
In running ahead there is neither expectation of something in the future nor is 
there a free-floating “future as such.” Running ahead “is” that being’s future 
which it itself is. But to be futural means to be “temporal.” Here, temporal does 
not mean “in time” but time itself (Heidegger 2011: 48-49). 
 
Overtones of such finite directionality can be heard in Ferneyhough’s take on the time 
arrow in relation to the musical object: the greater the consistency of autonomy of the 
musical object the more the time arrow that traverses it is “bent.” Reciprocally, the 
temporal “vector” damages the object; time is in a sense a force which compels the 
object to “reveal its own generative history” (Ferneyhough 1995: 45). This reciprocal 
relationship between object and time is essentially what gives rise to the musical figure 
as an event of confrontation and a process of energy accumulation and expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
3. Nancy: Sense, Materiality, Signification 
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The ideas presented in the previous sections should have provided an introduction to the 
composers’ theorization and a basic philosophical contextualisation. These 
philosophical ideas have been taken further by Jean-Luc Nancy, whose focus is 
somewhat different from Husserl and Heidegger. His account of spatiality and 
temporality has been described as “post-phenomenological,” as it moves beyond visual 
motifs of appearance in relation to consciousness (see James 2006: 96). For example, in 
Listening he introduces the concept of the “resonant subject” as opposed to the 
“phenomenological” or “philosophical” one (see Nancy 2007: 21-22). Such quasi- of 
post-phenomenology may enable an analysis that relies less on traditional conceptions 
of consciousness and subjectivity. Both Xenakis and Ferneyhough defied traditional 
views, such as the conception that music exists in time or that the “work” somehow 
remains intact and survives the sequence composer-performer-audience. The 
deconstruction of the Husserlian melody as the paradigm for time-consciousness can be 
studied in terms provided by Nancy’s work, which resonates with the responses of both 
composers, in particular with reference the notions of sense, resonance, (sonorous) 
materiality, and signification.14 Neither Xenakis nor Ferneyhough referred specifically 
to Nancy. Therefore, the remainder of this article will remain removed from Xenakis’s 
and Ferneyhough’s own philosophical references; it will address the possibilities of a 
Nancean reading, as an alternative to and not a substitute for thοse.15 
 Nancy’s writing avoids strict definitions and employs a more figurative than a 
denotational style, a style that is a direct result of his own philosophy. Nancy accepts 
Heidegger’s approach but insists on the latter’s (undeveloped) theme of being-with 
(Mitsein). This came along with a shift of focus from consciousness and signification 
(the particular way of understanding of the world and beings) to the notion of sense 
(sens), a word that Nancy takes in its multiple meanings, of which two are relevant here: 
the bodily sense of sensibility (sensation) and intelligibility (understanding) (cf. Barker 
2012). To the extent that it designates the sensible, sense presupposes a materiality; and 
                                                
14 As part of the post-structuralist strand, Nancy’s philosophy has never appeared in one definitive 
account that would comprise a book in the “encyclopedic” sense; on the contrary, the idea of 
fragmentation is central in his thinking, which appears fittingly fragmented in various collections of 
essays on reccurent themes. 
15 Fitch (2005) analyses Ferneyhough’s notion of the figure in relation to Gilles Deleuze’s critical analysis 
of Francis Bacon’s work (section 1.6). See part 3 in particular for a study of Ferneyhough’s notion of the 
tactility of time and an analysis of Mnemosyne and other works, based on Deleuze’s conception of 
rhythm, with reference to Theodor Adorno and Henri Bergson. 
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an ontology implicated in such a thinking can only be materialist. For Nancy, it is not so 
much that the world makes sense (intelligibly), but that it exists as sense, which is the 
condition for the existence of language, but at the same time it transcends it. Sense is in 
excess of language, at the same time prior to it and beyond signification: it is a sense of 
the world that is always already constituted as sense. Such thinking lends itself to terms 
that relate to the bodily, like that of touch. This term implies a certain exteriority and an 
impenetrable concreteness: what senses is a body and the mode of sense is that of touch-
separation at the limit (see Nancy 2008a: 17), a movement on the external limit of the 
concreteness of matter. The sense of touch then is a metonymy for all senses. The way 
this movement also implicates language is shown emphatically by the following two 
quotes: 
 
It is not a matter of signiﬁcation, but of the sense of the world as its very 
concreteness, that on which our existence touches and by which it is touched, in 
all possible senses (Nancy 1997: 10).   
 
Either as an audible voice or a visible mark, saying is corporeal, but what is said is 
incorporeal. … Language is not in the world or inside the world, as though the 
world were its body: it is the outside of the world in the world (Nancy 2000: 84). 
 
We can formulate this relationship as follows: bodies touch on matter, while sense (as 
the bodily event) exists on the outer limit of language, although simultaneously being 
the site where language can occur. 
 The concept that implicates the multiple registers of sense and that is most 
relevant here, is that of resonance. In Listening it is shown to relate to both matter and 
signification. Nancy thinks of sound, the vibration of the auditory body, as sonorous 
materiality, “voluminous and impenetrable” (2007: 40). Resonance is the sounding and 
re-sounding of matter, as sound presupposes the contact of material bodies16 and as 
vibration and reverberation it is always already a re-sounding. One could say that 
vibration is the rhythm of resonance and timbre its materiality. Music for Nancy is not 
exactly a phenomenon, as it is not brought about according to a logic of manifestation, 
but of “evocation.” The temporality of resonance is also the spatiality of a resonant, 
                                                
16 In a way, resonance is the touching of atmospheric vibrations on the body, on our body or the body of 
the instrument (be it electronic or not). 
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acoustic space; it is the rebound of sound in space. It is through the opening up of space 
that Nancy connects resonance to the function of language: although the two are by no 
means equivalent they do share the space designated by the “referral” or renvoi (2007: 
7-8).17 Music and language share the space of the sounded and re-sounded, and of the 
said and re-said. Signiﬁcation, as a system of references, is a tracing of space, or a 
spacing: 
 
Every spoken word is the simultaneity of at least two different modes of that 
spoken word; even when I am by myself, there is the one that is said and the one 
that is heard, that is, the one that is resaid (Nancy 2000: 86). 
  
 Listening is to strain towards a possible meaning (Nancy 2007: 6); but as sense, 
listening is also beyond understanding (here Nancy departs from Heidegger). Music and 
language are implicated in a relationship of touch and separation, which allows meaning 
to be perceived only at the limits, at the point of contact-separation between resonant 
materiality and signification. The exteriority in the mode of the relation between sense 
(listening), signification (language) and materiality (sound) is philosophically accounted 
for by a movement of tracing, of writing, which takes place at the limits between 
signification and sense, and between bodies (of sense) and matter. Nancy terms this 
movement of exteriorization, of writing at the exterior limit, exscription. Language 
always exscribes; it is outside of what it inscribes, as the outside of the world in the 
world (see James 2006: 150). According to Morin, 
 
What is inscribed […] is at the same time exscribed, placed outside of language 
by its contact with a material instance or a technical apparatus. […] It is through 
this double exscription of signification and sense, and of sense and bodies, that 
thought can touch the thing (2012: 132). 
 
This subtle relationship between sense and matter, and sense and language provides the 
main vehicle by which to understand Xenakis’s and Ferneyhough’s approach to 
temporality, via the materialism of the former and the deconstructive strategies of the 
latter. 
                                                
17 Renvoi, from renvoyer, means both to echo, to reflect, to refer, and to (re)send. Although Nancy does 
note the renvoi from sign to thing, signification should be here thought of as the spacing of the plurality 
of the modes of signs and of the différance of chains of signifiers. 
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 Resonance is also closely related to Nancy’s approach to subjectivity, presence 
and presentation.18 He denies the Kantian a priori synthesis of the sensible and the 
intelligible (pure presentation and philosophical presentation) and considers the 
grounding of this unity to be suspended. Nancy uses for such suspension the term 
syncopation. This designates an essentially temporal, if not musical, movement of 
presentation and withdrawal: “What is called consciousness probably never allows itself 
to be grasped as an identity except when it blacks out: it is the syncope” (Nancy 2008b: 
10). Such a suspension suggests an interruption of the “thinking subject” (see James 
2006: 48). The constitutive moment of subjectivity, Descartes’ “I think therefore I am,” 
precedes the possibility of its utterance, that is, of language. Nancy’s response comes 
not as a concept, but as the figure of the gaping mouth (la bouche). What thinks itself is 
not a consciousness but a ruptured identity which is intricately implicated in a 
syncopated movement (of presentation-withdrawal and of opening).19 We can now think 
of Nancy’s “resonant subject,” as the movement of la bouche; this is an instance of the 
aforementioned move beyond phenomenology: 
 
It is a question […] of going back from the phenomenological subject, an 
intentional line of sight, to an intensive spacing of a rebound that does not end in 
any return to self without immediately relaunching, as an echo, a call to that same 
self (Nancy 2007: 21). 
 
Because of Nancy’s insistence on the being-with, the plurality of being presupposes a 
contemporaneity as exteriority. As it precedes language but also goes beyond it, the 
resonant subject is a movement of syncopation and opening that takes place at the limits 
of presentation.20 
                                                
18 Kane (2012) offers an interesting comparative study of Nancy’s and Schaeffer’s approach to listening, 
with particular reference to Nancy’s conception of the “resonant subject” and the the possibilities it offers 
of moving beyond the phenomenological subject (see pp. 444ff. in particular). 
19 In “How Music Listens to Itself” Nancy elaborates further on a musical subjectivity: “listening is 
musical when it is music that listens to itself” (Nancy 2007: 67). Adorno claimed that we have to rethink 
the musical subject, in search of an aesthetics whose “medium would be the reflection of musical 
experience upon itself” (Adorno 1992: 321). Maas (2005) compares these approaches and provides a 
study of gesture in Xenakis with reference to Delleuze and the idea of the fold (plissement). 
20 Nancy’s critique of Husserl touches on subjectivity: “[Husserl] does not concentrate his ear on musical 
resonance but rather converts it ahead of time into the object of an intention that configures it. Sound 
(and/or sense) is what is not at first intended. It is not first 'intentioned': on the contrary, sound is what 
places its subject, which has not preceded it with an aim, in tension, or under tension” (Nancy 2007: 20). 
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 Nancy’s elaboration of a materialist ontology also invokes a term from Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty: partes extra partes (parts outside parts), as the mode according to 
which an object “acknowledges between its parts, or between itself and other objects 
only external and mechanical relations” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 84). Nancy’s term for 
such conception of the world is ecotechnical (Nancy 2008a: 89) and its aesthetic 
counterpart is technicity: a term that responds to the sensible dimension of experience, 
as opposed to the religious/poetic. As sense (the beyond of signification), technicity is 
also beyond “Art” and beyond the logic of the work. Technicity is “out-of-workness 
[désoeuvrement]” (Nancy 1996: 37), it places the work outside of itself as an 
exscription of sense; thus it evokes another instance of opening or a syncopation of 
presentation. 
 Finally, Nancy’s take on musical time has clear references to his de-centred 
subjectivity and syncopated presence. He defines rhythm as 
 
the time of time, the vibration of time itself in the stroke of a present that presents 
it by separating from itself. […] Rhythm separates the succession of the linearity 
of the sequence of length of time: it bends time to give it to time itself (Nancy 
2007: 17). 
 
This folding and unfolding movement is what gives rise to the resonant subject, to the 
extent that its temporality conditions its meaning. This is what Nancy means when he 
says that music “anticipates [the] arrival [of presence] and remembers its departure, 
itself remaining suspended and straining between the two: time and sonority, sonority as 
time and as meaning” (Nancy 2007: 20). 
 
4. Xenakis and the Spacing of Time 
Let us now return to Xenakis’s thoughts on contiguity in relation to space-time, about 
which he poses the question: “What could […] time and space signify [if] contiguity is 
abolished?” (1992: 256). This is a question that relates to direct contact, to a materialist 
universe where no gaps are admitted. His thought experiment with the two chains of 
contiguous events, relates this notion (contiguity) to those of anteriority and 
separability. For Xenakis then, the mode of existence of entities is, in Nancean terms, 
that of touch-separation. The two chains in the aforementioned experiment have no 
common link; they can either be anterior to one another, in a relation of touch-
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separation, or “indifferently synchronous,” simultaneous. For Xenakis the contiguity-
separability of chains of events (local clocks, as he called them) is the condition of 
temporality. In the case of sonorous events, this simultaneity would be the Nancean 
space-time of the “sonorous present” and of “sonorous place” (Nancy 2007: 13 & 16). 
We can then extend Xenakis’s account even in the case of a single chain of events, via 
an analogy of spacing as tracing. 
 Anteriority accounts for temporality in the context of a singular instance of a 
chain of contiguous events. In Nancy’s approach of the singular-plural any singularity 
exists in relation to other singularities. Space is the (temporal) unfolding of the exposing 
of singularities to one another (see James 2006: 61-62). The singular-plural mode 
entails a spacing, a movement of “exteriorization,” a temporality that is spaced as a 
sharing of space-time: time is in that sense always already contemporary. As I have 
shown previously (Exarchos 2015), Xenakis’s linking of time and space is radicalised 
when thought in Nancean terms: the possibility of temporal relations between the two 
chains of contiguous events is afforded by what the latter calls the spacing of time; an 
immediate effect of the singular-plural is that there is no pure succession without 
simultaneity. 
 The condition of the trace, which structures our temporal experience, is the 
contiguity-separability of entities and events. Xenakis thinks of the trace as the function 
of the Husserlian retention and protention; he thought that the events’ traces, are 
“instantaneously hauled up outside of time”. We can think of the trace here in the place 
of one of the two chains; and conversely, a single chain of events has its correlative 
events as traces, as another mode of the same temporal event (the sounded/resounded 
and the said/resaid). If, as Nancy would argue, time is always already contemporary, 
every sonic event is itself involved in a simultaneity brought about by a movement of 
tracing as the spacing of time (cf. Exarchos 2015: 9). This accounts for the Xenakian 
“outside of time” as what enables the experience of time in musical listening, even in 
the elementary instance of a single stratum of musical activity (by providing its own 
reference-events as traces).21 As the contemporaneity of time is only conceivable in a 
                                                
21 In Xenakis’s compositional/analytical approach of temporality, the spacing of time is equivalent to 
outside-time structures as ordered structures, where “you can arrange all the elements into a room full of 
the other elements. You can say that the set is higher in pitch, or later in time, or use some comparative 
adjective: bigger, larger, smaller” (Zaplitny 1975: 97). 
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plural world of being-with in touch-separation, Xenakis’s conceptualization of a 
universe of contiguity-separability is the prerequisite for the consciousness of time. 
Xenakis does use the term consciousness, but with some reservation; when he affirms 
that it belongs in a world of contact-separation, he also questions whether consciousness 
is a mental category (Xenakis 1992: 263). He does not provide an answer, but hopefully 
this study shows that an answer might be found in a shift of perspective from 
consciousness to sense. 
 
5. Ferneyhough and Exscription 
It is well known that for Ferneyhough, not only the score is not a sound-image of the 
work, but that the composition, in performance, is but a token of the (forced) selection-
procedure by the performer. Although he employs a traditional mode of notation (that 
is, not graphic scores), the score is part of the work in an undecidable way (that is, 
according to conventional practices and uses of the terms “score,” “writing,” “work”). 
But while conventionally it might be said that Ferneyhough’s scores go beyond the 
possibilities of representation (due to their informational overload), we see that the 
score operates precisely at the limits of presentation. Ferneyhough describes one of the 
aspects of his notational practice as the “intermediary, connecting border areas of 
representation” (Ferneyhough 1995: 5). He problematizes not only the notation of his 
own works, but the possibility of representational notation in general. This is not meant 
to simply say that faithful notation is impossible; beyond notation, what is 
problematized is the ontological status of the work itself. The work is not locatable, but 
is evoked by the notation, in a movement of a suspended presentation-withdrawal, of a 
syncopated presence. Thus, Ferneyhough’s breaking wave is Nancy’s syncope. As 
Ferneyhough’s notation operates at the limits of representation, it invokes a function of 
musical notation at the “vanishing point” of musical signification. We can see this 
approach as exscription, as musical signification that exscribes a musical sense which 
takes place at the other side of the outer limit, as the touch-separation of sense and 
language. 
 Notation is therefore neither merely a description of sounds, nor a prescription for 
actions—it is not even an inscription of musical ideas; rather, the score is an 
exscription, an attempt to trace a specific instrumental technique and its resonance. As 
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such, the score is multiply removed from the sound-image of the work, although 
notation is as much part of the work as its performance.22 Compositional technique is 
not subservient to the reproduction of internally heard sounds, but is itself an evocation 
of resonance (even of previously unheard-of sounds). In Ferneyhough’s words, “One of 
the ‘complex’ things about ‘complex’ music is its quality of refusing to present a 
straightforward object […]: it is always perceived in the act of underlining its own 
ongoing and provisional nature” (1995: 69). Such provisional nature should not be taken 
to suggest a certain negation of the musical work; rather, it should point to the resonant 
nature not only of musical objects, but also of the “work” itself, indicated by the 
movement of the syncope (which also points to performers’ and listeners’ own 
subjectivity in Ferneyhough’s feedback loop). This is what he suggests when he says 
that “complex” music does not rely on any representational illusion, “because of the 
continual problematization of the performance/interpretation context” (Ferneyhough 
1995: 69). 
 
6. Resonant Sieves 
Xenakis and Ferneyhough attempted a response to the challenge of temporality in quite 
different ways. We see now that these responses correspond to the intricate 
configuration that implicates materiality and signification/representation through the 
movement of sense. However, it is not simply a schema of matter on the one hand and 
signification on the other, with sense mediating between the two. It should be clear by 
now that the outside/inside is not a binary opposition, but accounts for a relationship of 
touch-separation in fragmentary and materialist world. This is because the world is 
always-already constituted as sense, and in turn sense is both the possibility for 
language and at the same time in excess of it. According to this relation then, we can 
say that Xenakis’s response came with a materialist world-view, a materialism that 
includes sound as materiality, which we can term, sonority.23 In musical terms, his 
response took the form of pitch scales (sieves) which extend to the extremes of the 
audible range and which are to be performed as sonorities, rather than as scales on 
                                                
22 Ferneyhough (1975) refers to how certain “impurities” are intended (both by composer and performer) 
in the attempt of a valid realisation of the score (cf. Clerc Parada 2014: 131-132). 
23 Solomos provides a post-Adornian conceptualization of sonority as the coincidence of form and 
(musical) material (see 1996: chapter 5). The present usage is quite different as my aims and methods 
here do not rely on such terms. 
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which melodic shapes are to be constructed. On the outside of this materialist sonorous 
world, Ferneyhough attempted to provide a “meaningful” place for notation, but aiming 
at a meaning which can only be conceived at its borders. His music ontology allows him 
to emancipate notation from any claims to representation, even more than language 
could possibly be. The latter is so because notation is implicated in a discourse of the 
“work” (which for Ferneyhough notation can only evoke) as an exscription at the limits 
of signification. What is in touch-separation with both Xenakis’s sonority and 
Ferneyhough’s exscription is precisely an excessive sense of listening: to the former 
listening is beyond the “liminal structures of time, space, logic” (Xenakis 1969: 51), and 
to the latter notating means “to listen to [the work’s] echo” (Ferneyhough 1995: 5). 
 In other words, both composers responded to the question of temporality (and 
ontology) of music by dealing with two different kinds of resonance. Their particular 
responses are very close but distinct: Xenakis’s sonority (as opposed to 
melody/harmony) is the site of touch between sense and matter (listening and 
resonance), while Ferneyhough’s exscription (as the notation of resonance) accounts for 
the syncopated movement of sense at the limits of signification. Xenakis’s notational 
practice has not received particular mention in the this article, as it never seemed to 
constitute a site of experimentation for him. His scores seem to mostly function as 
cartesian planes. In Exarchos 2015 I referred to exscription as the function of the middle 
category (the temporal) in Xenakis’s compositional/analytical account of the 1960s. 
However, exscription of resonance finds a much richer meaning in Ferneyhough’s 
approach to signification, representation and formal articulation. Similarly, Xenakis’s 
insistent materialism is not shared by Ferneyhough, whose practice appeals more to the 
deconstructive function of notation, than to the physicality of sonority. Resonance 
therefore is to Xenakis a fundamental materiality of sound and to Ferneyhough a 
syncopated movement of presentation-withdrawal that implicates the subjectivity of the 
performer/listener and the work’s sonorous presence. Interestingly, they approached this 
with different kinds of sieves. Although mention had been made of Xenakis’s sieves as 
scales, Ferneyhough’s sieves—to be discussed shortly—refer to formal articulation. 
 Xenakis utilized sieves since the 1960s, but he attempted a novel application in 
Jonchaies, as “multiplicities of timbre classes” (1977: n.p.) beyond melodic/harmonic 
treatment. In his own words, 
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If you take a given range, and if the structure of the scale is rich enough, you can 
stay there without having to resort to melodic patterns—the interchange of the 
sounds themselves in a rather free rhythmic movement produces a melodic flow 
which is neither chords nor melodic patterns. […] They give a kind of overall 
timbre in a particular domain (Varga 1996: 145). 
 
Later he would develop these multiplicities into a heterophonic technique that he called 
“artificial reverberation” (1981: n.p.); in other cases he would use sieves along with 
cellular automata that treat sound as a “fluid in time” (Varga 1996: 200). Sieves were 
used as primary material for their particular timbre, produced by playing on their 
continuum, linearly, as clusters, or in heterophony. A piece of this period that relies 
heavily on sieves is Keqrops (1986, for piano and orchestra). In Example 4 the winds 
play sieve-cluster tetrachords (each instrument plays the pitches of one tetrachord in 
random succession) while the piano’s dense hexachords are based on a different sieve 
and the double basses combined with the harps play near-chromatic decachords (see 
Exarchos 2008: 183-184). Considering also the loud dynamics and slow tempo, the 
music hardly aims at any patterns other than the complex timbres thus produced. Thus, 
outside-time structures (sieves) are employed in order to produce resonant structures 
(sonorities) whose status as sonorous objects relies on a resonant materiality. To borrow 
Ferneyhough’s image, Xenakis’s music of this period corresponds more to the rock than 
to the wave.24 
 
                                                
24 In a way, Xenakis’s timbre classes constitute a continuation of his work on sound masses of the 1950s. 
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Example 4. Xenakis, Keqrops, mm. 130-33© Copyright 1986 by Editions Salabert, Paris. Reproduced with kind 
authorization of Editions Salabert. 
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 In works like Mnemosyne (for bass flute and pre-recorded tape),25 Ferneyhough 
utilizes a “filtering” of several layers, where processes might diverge or converge and 
thereby impulses of singular processes might coincide and even cancel each other out.26 
This kind of filtering process is as a different kind of sieve, a term Ferneyhough used to 
describe his compositional approach to his Second String Quartet (1995: 117-130). In 
this work the sieve process is aimed at “separating, as far as possible, aspects of 
organization from those of presentation” (Ferneyhough 1995: 118), whereby sounds 
stand in for silence and silences stand in for a “deliberate absence” at the “centre” of the 
work (1995: 117). This centre is arrived at via an accelerated convergence of musical 
processes (each associated with one type or sub-type of material), which interfere to the 
point of filtering-out or permeating each other. In Example 5 we see how m. 40, in 
which silence coloured by “impoverished” sounds, has undergone what the composer 
called a “fragile foregrounding of absence” by a multiple glissando (1995: 122). That is, 
two kinds of silence (literal and coloured) on two different formal layers interact in 
order to produce measures of one type or the other. Therefore, the method that such 
filtering is based on is a formal sieve. Such processes converge to the point of 
complexity shown in Example 6, where the materials seem to permeate each other; the 
glissandi that originally appeared as colourings of silence, now accompany the primary 
material in the first and then the second violin. Another instance of formal intersection 
between sieve-layers can be seen in the silence of m. 150. This filtering-out of the 
primary “unison” material by silence is not unique in the work but this time it is to be 
played “legato” with the same type of material of the preceding measure (unlike the 
abrupt “tagliare subito” in the silence of m. 133). The result is a change in the status of 
silence, which is now to be taken as part of the primary material (with the impossible 
instruction to play legato over the intervening silence). This suggests a certain absence 
as one “descends” to a greater convergence of musical processes, a descent that is 
carried out via the depth-levels provided by the layers of the sieve. The perceptual 
outcome of this formal sieve is for Ferneyhough a complex layering “between the 
                                                
25 The three levels of rhythmic organization in Mnemosyne provide the site of multi-layered interfering 
functions, and they refer to (a) the downbeat stamping of the tape material; (b) the subsurface rhythmic 
models and their degree of explicit presentation; and (c) the interruptive activity of three independently 
calculated rhythmic patterns in the solo part (Ferneyhough 1995: 45). 
26 One might here note that a rhythmic model occasionally appears “syncopated” in the grammatical sense 
of omission. 
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listener and that still centre of apprehension,” while listening to the work’s elements “as 
radiating out from it” (Ferneyhough 1995: 118). 
 
 
 
 
Example 5. Ferneyhough, Second String Quartet, mm. 39-41 © Copyright 1981 by 
Hinrichsen Edition, Peters Edition Ltd., London. Reproduced by kind permission 
of Peters Edition Limited, London. 
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Example 6: Ferneyhough, Second String Quartet, mm. 150-4 © Copyright 1981 by Hinrichsen Edition, Peters 
Edition Ltd., London. Reproduced by kind permission of Peters Edition Limited, London. 
 
 Such processes, in the above and other works, provide complex temporal frames, 
whereby Ferneyhough’s non-linear directionality of time is constantly re-evaluated also 
due to the disposition of the listening body in the acoustic space. Further, as they 
depend on different degrees of “transparency” of the musical objects, these processes 
allow for varying resistances within time frames. Ferneyhough talks about the “time 
arrow” and how this might be “bent” at such confrontational moments. We can think 
this in relation to Nancy’s definition of rhythm as the bending of time, the “vibration of 
time itself;” that is, not as the time of resonance, but, in a way, as the resonance of 
Peer-Reviewed Paper                                JMM: The Journal of Music and Meaning, vol. 13, 2014/2015  
88 
 
syncopation, exemplified by the breaking wave. In Ferneyhough’s terms, such resonant 
temporality is the result of the “pendulum-like motion” between subsurface rhythmic 
processes and the emergence of sonic events (Ferneyhough 1995: 49); events that are 
only perceived at the time they black out. One could say then that Ferneyhough’s formal 
sieves are aimed at activating the syncopated movement of the work’s echo. 
 
As this article has shown, Xenakis had proceeded with increasing preoccupation with 
the acoustic materiality of timbre, which led to sieve-construction and complex 
sonorities. In a very different way, Ferneyhough’s approach to temporality is 
inextricably linked to his notational practice, where the work (as opposed to the 
“Work”) is evoked in a syncopated movement of presentation-withdrawal. It is a matter 
of two different, but associated, kinds of resonance: that of sonority (sonorous 
materiality) and that of syncopated presence. These involve the temporality (and 
spatiality) of resonance as the (re)sounding of matter, and that of the resonance of the 
syncope. Interestingly, both composers developed different kinds of sieves and their 
practice can be situated in two different “outsides” of Nancy’s philosophy (materiality 
and signification). The relation between these is indicated by exscription; likewise, 
listening strains both to the limits of sonorous matter and to the echo of signification. 
There is no evidence that Xenakis and Ferneyhough had been in contact with each other 
about their ideas, nor that either of them was aware of Nancy’s work at the time. 
However, this article has been an attempt to compare the musical thinking of these 
composers through their writings and work of around the same time (avoiding 
biographical or historical sources); admittedly, the writings by Nancy referred to here 
span a longer period of time, up to the recent past. However, I hope that this has proved 
a convincing interpretation of the thinking of all three. Further research could perhaps 
point to new conceptions of musical ontology and subjectivity. For the moment, the 
present work can also be seen as a contribution to the debate of music materiality as 
opposed to music signification. Neither claim can be straightforward; what I have tried 
here was to outline, or indeed exscribe, some ideas and practices by allowing multiple 
registers of resonance. 
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